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T IS APPARENT TO THOSE APPEARING before the Ohio Civil Rights
Commission that the Commission's present procedures and limited
powers afford an advantage to the respondent desirous of thwarting
the Commission's regulatory process.' This advantage stems from
the fact that due process mandates the establishment of a factual
foundation prior to determining whether to impose disciplinary
measurers for the alleged noncompliance with regulatory legislation.'
If the development of this factual foundation can be frustrated,
effective regulatory processes cannot proceed.
In the instance where a respondent cooperates fully in supplying
the Commission with requested relevant information the procedures
can continue in an orderly progressive manner. However, when a
respondent refuses to comply with a Commission request for the
production of any relevant information necessary for the continua-
tion of the regulatory proceedings, the proceedings are brought to
a halt. The traditional response of administrative agencies to this
refusal to produce has been to refer such matters to the appropriate
court for examination and further action. If the agency has acted
within its authority, if its requests are reasonably related to the
regulatory purposes of the agency, and if the respondent's arguments
in support of the refusal to supply the information are rejected, the
court ultimately compels the production of the information.3
* A. Hofstra University; J.D. The Ceveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College
of Law; Member, Ohio Bar; Staff Attorney, Women's Law Fund, Inc.
* *B.A. Western Reserve University; J.D. Case Western Reserve University; Member, Ohio
Bar; Staff Attorney, Women's Law Fund, Inc.
t Initial work for this article was performed while the authors were working in a program
funded by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The statements and
opinions expressed herein are solely those of the authors and do not reflect the official or
unofficial positions or policies of the Women's Law Fund, Inc., or any agency or instru-
mentality of the United States Government.
1Although this article concerns itself primarily with the problems which arise when a
respondent is reluctant to comply with a Commission investigatory request, similar
problems arise when complainants no longer have any interest in pursuing their charges
or "vanish". For a general discussion of the Ohio Civil Rights Commission; see Robinson,
The New Fair Employment Law, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 570 (1959).
2 Administrative agencies have been unsuccessful when asking courts to uphold its orders
when those orders are not predicated upon factual findings. See Erie R.R. Co. v. United
States, 59 F.Supp. 748 (S.D. Ohio 1945) (administrative orders void if, inter alia, facts
found do not support order of agency); State ex rel. Squire v. National City Bank of
Cleveland, 56 Ohio App. 401, 11 N.E.2d 93 (1937) (arbitrary or capricious exercise of
power by administrative agency offends due process clause of U.S. Constitution).
3 See McMillan v. Ohio Civil Rights Commission, 39 Ohio Misc. 83 (C.P. 1974).
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Considerable time passes between the Commission's request for
production and the court's order to produce. The result is that the
respondent who has complied voluntarily with an agency request is
in a more advanced phase of the agency proceeding, while the recal-
citrant respondent has reaped a short-term benefit of delay by not
complying until ordered to do so by the court. This delay, resulting
from the administrative decision to litigate the question of the obli-
gation to produce the information, is most inappropriate in discrim-
ination cases. When individuals allege that they have been victims
of discrimination in housing, employment or public accommodations,
they are claiming that they have been denied rights basic to an
egalitarian society. During the period between the alleged violation
and a resolution, these individuals will be forced into the periphery
of society. Because in many instances the victims of discrimination
are already out of the mainstream of the basic societal structure,
any delay in the resolution process merely compounds the problem
and should not be tolerated. As John Rawls points out in his work,
A Theory of Justice, the basic structure of society
contains various social positions and . . . men born into
different positions have different expectations of life deter-
mined, in part, by the political system as well as by economic
and social circumstances. In this way the institutions of
society favor certain starting places over others. These are
especially deep inequalities. Not only are they pervasive, but
they affect men's initial chances in life; yet they cannot
possibly be justified by an appeal to notions of merit or
desert. It is these inequalities, presumably inevitable in the
basic structure of any society, to which the principles of
social justice must in the first instance reply.4
Any delay in the processing of a charge of discrimination results
in a serious denial of justice for both the complainant and the re-
spondent,' and also amounts to an unnecessary expenditure of Com-
mission resources during preliminary stages of an investigation.
Consequently, it is necessary that a mechanism be adopted whereby
sanctions can be imposed upon the respondent who refuses to comply
with discovery demands for relevant information. This mechanism
is essential to enable the Commission to more effectively utilize its
investigatory resources and to increase the Commission's efficency
in enforcing its statutory duty.
4 J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 7 (1971).
SDelay in problem-resolution can also adversely affect respondents. While allegations of
discrimination are pending against them, respondents may find themselves unable to
obtain government contracts, to hire or to promote employees or to transfer any interest
in the business venture involved.
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It is the intention of this article to discuss the existing devices
available to the Ohio Civil Rights Commission to compel a respondent
to provide the relevant factual information requested; to point out
the inadequacies of these procedures; and to propose an additional
method to effectuate a speedy resolution of the controversies before
the Ohio Civil Rights Commission.
The Present Powers of the Commission
The present powers of the Ohio Civil Rights Commission are
delineated by statutes and Commission Rules and Regulations.6 When
the Commission is conducting an investigation it has the right of
access, as is reasonably necessary for the furtherance of the investiga-
tion,7 to relevant documents, records and individuals. If necessary,
subpoenas and interrogatories may be issued to a respondent "to
the same extent and subject to the same limitations as would apply
if [they] were issued ... in aid of a civil action in a common pleas
court."8
The Commission's subpoena power' is as broad as the subpoena
power invoked in aid of a civil action. In civil actions, subpoenas,
issued pursuant to Rule 45,10 are used primarily for the purpose of
obtaining information from persons who are not parties to an action.
Similarly, the Commission's subpoena power, available to both re-
spondents and the Commission, is used to produce witnesses at in-
vestigatory hearings.
Of primary concern here is the procedure for the enforcement
of subpoenas and the imposition of sanctions for the refusal to obey
subpoenas.
It is discretionary with the Commission whether or not to
enforce subpoenas. In cases of contumacy or refusal, the Commission
may petition for enforcement of a subpoena in the court of com-
mon pleas."1 in addition, upon the failure of a person to obey a sub-
poena or subpoena duces tecum, the Commission may apply to the
court of common pleas for an order to show cause or "such further
relief as may be appropriate pursuant to . . . Civil Rule 37." 12 Al-
6 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112, et seq. (Page 1973); OHIO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION
RULES AND REGULATIONS [hereinafter cited as CR-].
7OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.04(B) (3) (a) (Page 1973).
8 Id.
9The subpoena powers of the Commission are found in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
4112.04(B) (3) (a), 4112.04(B) (3) (b), 4112.04 (B) (4), 4112.04(B) (5), 4112.04
(B) (6) (Page 1973), and CR-23 and 24, supra note 6.
10 Rule 45 of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1970, closely follows Federal
Rule 45. Consequently, case interpretation of the Federal counterparts should be appli-
cable to the procedures under the Ohio rules where the exact language has been adopted.
11 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.04(B) (6) (Page 1973).
72 CR-23.03, supra note 6.
[Vol. 24: 62
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1975
CIVIL RIGHTS BY DEFAULT
though Section 4112.99 provides for the possibility of a fine for re-
fusing to obey a subpoena, the Commission does not consider this
the sole remedy. 3 The reference to Rule 37 makes it apparent that
lesser sanctions are available to the court in enforcing its contempt
power, and of course the Commission can also request the court to
impose further sanctions if necessary to accomplish the Commission's
purposes.
As noted above, the Commission through its general discovery
power 14 is also given the authority to issue interrogatories to a
respondent, in the same manner as is done in a civil matter. 5 Through
its rule making power, the Commission has adopted procedures to
be followed where objections to interrogatories are filed by a
respondent.16
However, unlike the statutory provisions governing the enforce-
ment of subpoenas, there are no statutory provisions available to
the Commission to compel answers to interrogatories. Consequently,
any such power is either nonexistent or must be implied from refer-
ences in the statutes to Rule 37 and the procedures utilized in a
common pleas court.17
The statutory scheme, relegating interrogatories to an inferior
position in the discovery process, places an undue emphasis upon the
subpoena process. Without the power to compel answers to inter-
rogatories, the Commission has made limited use of them. Rather, it
seeks, through the subpoena power, to gain access to those records
which will provide the information needed to complete discovery. If a
respondent refuses to comply, the Commission is then free to proceed
into court to enforce the subpoena. Such a procedure is wasteful,
time-consuming and inefficient. Without effective enforcement powers,
vis-a-vis the interrogatory powers, the Commission is forced to do
indirectly through the subpoena power that which it is not able to
do by utilization of the interrogatory power. When faced with a
reluctant respondent, the Commission must determine whether or
not the data sought is worth the expenditure of time and expense in
proceeding to court to obtain an order compelling compliance. It is
necessary therefore, in order to streamline this cumbersome proce-
13 In a formal opinion of the Ohio Attorney General, it is made clear that although the
Commission may cause suspected violators of the civil rights statutes to be prosecuted, the
penalties provided in Ohio Revised Code Section 4112.99 may be imposed only by a
trial judge of a court of competent jurisdiction and then only after a trial and conviction
of the accused violator. Ohio Att'y Gen. Op., Opinion No. 70-108 (1970).
14The general discovery powers of the Commission are established by OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 4112.04(B) (3) (a) (Page 1973), and CR-22, 24 and 26, supra note 6.
Is See note 8 supra.
16 CR-24, supra note 6.
17See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.04(B) (3) (a) (Page 1973), CR-22.01, 22.02,
24.01, supra note 6.
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dure and to make the Commission a more efficient and effective agency,
to increase the discovery powers of the Commission, primarily with
respect to the usefulness of the interrogatory tool.
Proposed Solution
Except for the subpoena power discussed earlier, the present'
statute provides no explicit procedure to be used when respondents
before the Commission refuse to cooperate with legitimate Commis-
sion investigations and hearings. House Bill 1195 [H.B. 1195], which
sought to amend various sections of the Ohio Civil Rights Act and
fill this void, was before the 110th Session of the Ohio General
Assembly; but, much to the dismay of those interested in its passage,
the bill died in committee." It is the authors' hope that a bill that
will adequately meet this problem will be passed in the 111th Session) 9
Under H.B. 1195, upon a respondent's failure to comply with a
Commission request for answers to interrogatories, the Commission
would have had two alternatives available. Proposed Section 4112.04
(B) (6) would have made available to the Commission, upon con-
tumacy or refusal, the right to petition for enforcement in the court
of common pleas, on the basis that the recalcitrant was in contempt
of court. Alternatively, and more importantly, the Commission,
pursuant to proposed Section 4112.05 (E), could have entered default
against a respondent failing to answer a complaint or interrogatories
and proceeded with a hearing on the evidence in support of the com-
plaint. The entry of default would have implied that failure to answer
was an admission of the truth of the charges and that respondent had
waived any right to participate in the succeeding administrative
steps. However, this default, once entered, would not necessarily have
been final; proposed Section 4112.05 (E) further provided that for
good cause shown upon equitable terms and conditions, the Commission
could have set aside the default.
While the proposed Bill was a step in the right direction, there
were two major deficiencies in its provisions. The first of these was the
lack of an order-notice sequence such as is found in the New Jersey
Civil Rights Statute.20 The New Jersey plan provides that failure to
answer interrogatories, after a Commission order to answer coupled
18 1n Ohio H.B. No. 611, 110th General Assembly (1973-74), the Legislature did approve
the amendments, but only insofar as they extend protection to persons who suffer dis-
crimination on the basis of sex.
19According to Rep. Michael Stinziano (D-30), it is probable that House Bill 1195, or a
bill comparable to it, will be introduced in the 111th Session, as the proposed bill had
the backing of the Ohio Civil Rights Commission and numerous legislators.
20 N.J.A.C. 13:4-1.1 et seq. (The New Jersey Administrative Code is an official publication
of the State of New Jersey. It contains rules, regulations and other documents filed with the
Division of Administrative Procedure pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act of the
Laws of 1968, N.J.A.C. 52:14 B-1 et seq.).
[Vol. 24:62
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with notice of the consequences for failure to so respond, "shall result
in the matters regarding which questions were asked being taken as
established." 21 It is based on this "admission" that default judgment
is entered. This system preserves the respondent's rights by not
concluding that the refusal to answer was an admission of the want
of merit in the answers until after the respondent has been informed
of the charges 22 and has been given timely notice and an opportunity
to answer the charges or interrogatories.23 In addition, the statutory
scheme provides a fair and impartial manner for conducting the
proceedings.2 4 The proposed Ohio plan did not adopt this order-notice
sequence.25 Rather, it strengthened the Commission's present subpoena
power and provided new procedures governing the Commission's
interrogatory powers.
Under the present statutory scheme the court of common pleas
enforces Commission subpoenas :26 the proposed amendments assumed
the validity of the Commission-issued subpoena and treated the
refusal to obey as an act in contempt of court. As the present law
stands, the refusal to answer or object to interrogatories issued during
the investigatory stage of the Ohio procedure can be enforced as a
contempt of court.2 7 This procedure would still have been followed
under the proposed House Bill. However, the bill provided that once
the Commission had issued and served a written complaint upon a
respondent, failure to answer either the complaint or interrogatories
would have resulted in the Commission entering default against the
respondent.28 In order to protect the constitutional due process rights
of the respondent, this mandatory default could have been set aside
for good cause. Since the default judgment could have been set aside
"for good cause shown upon equitable terms and conditions", 29 this
21 N.J.A.C. 13:4-8.3 (b) (1).
2 N.J.A.C. 13:4-8.3 (a) (1) & (2) (provides for informing the respondent of charges filed
against him).
23 The default procedure is to be used only after the respondent has failed to exercise his
rights to answer and has had notice of the consequences which will follow. N.J.A.C.
13:4-8.3. See also the Rules and Regulations of the Ohio Civil Rights Commission.
CR-11.07 and 23.03, supra note 6.
24 N.J.A.C. 13:4-12.1 et seq.
25 By utilization of the rule-making power of the Commission, § 4112.04 (A) (4), such a
procedure could be adopted. Indeed, so as to insure a respondent's due process rights,
such procedures must be adopted. Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671-73 (1974)
and cases cited therein.
26 See note 11 supra and discussion in accompanying text.
2 Ohio H.B. No. 1195, 110th General Assembly, § 4112.04(B) (6) (1973-74) [hereinafter
cited as "H.B." eg. H.B.1195, § 4112.04(B) (6)].
H.B. 1195, § 4112.05 (D).
2H.B. 1195, § 4112.05 (E).
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safeguard would have forestalled" a respondent from positing sup-
posed violations of constitutional rights and relevancy in lieu of
replying to discovery requests. 31 The proposed H.B. 1195 therefore
clearly complied with the protections afforded to the respondent under
the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution.
In the case of a failure to answer a complaint, these amendments
would have merely been the adoption into statute of that which
currently is provided for by regulation. 32 And as to discovery pro-
ceedings, the proposed amendments merely transferred some of the
existing sanction powers from the courts to a quasi-judicial body, with
judicial review of the agency decision available to the respondent.33
While the proposed default mechanism of H.B. 1195 would have
improved the existing Commission discovery procedures, obvious
omissions existed. Although the legislation, as introduced, extended
to the Commission the power to utilize all discovery procedures,3 it
made only the failure to answer a complaint or interrogatories grounds
for the entry of default. Thus, the Commission would have been
forced to resort to the court to enforce all other discovery demands.
The natural outgrowth of this would have been increase in the Com-
mission's use of interrogatories and a decrease in the use of other
useful discovery devices. In many instances interrogatories may not
be the most efficient or effective device available for obtaining
relevant information. Yet, the cumbersome procedures which would
be required to obtain compliance with these alternative devices will
naturally result in an increased reliance upon interrogatories. To
better effectuate the purpose for which these legislative changes are
made, logic would dictate that the default mechanism should be ex-
tended to include not only situations of failure to answer complaints
or interrogatories but all failures to comply with requests under the
discovery process.
Such an extension would make uniform the procedures to be
followed when there is a failure to respond to a request for discovery,
rather than providing one procedure for the enforcement of subpoenas,
another for compelling answers to interrogatories, and yet a third
for dealing with all other discovery devices.
30 Having failed to make timely objections to interrogatories, a respondent, who first receives
adequate notice of the consequences, will be deemed to have waived the right to object.
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 547-48 (1868). Cf. Escobedo v. Illinois, 387
U.S. 478 (1964); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. (1966); Schiebelhut v. United
States, 318 F.2d 785 (6th Cir. 1963); Zatko v. Rogers Mfg. Co., 37 F.R.D. 29
(N.D. Ohio 1969).
31 CR-14, supra note 6.
3 2CR-11:07, .rupra note 6-Failure to Answer, provides, upon the failure to file an answer,
for the entrance of default and a continuation of the hearing on evidence in support of the
complaint.
0HIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.06(A) (Page 1973).
-H.B. 1195 § 4112.04(B) (3) (a).
[Vol. 24: 62
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Finally, any default mechanism adopted by the Commission,
whether by statute or through utilization of its rule-making power,
must include a procedure similar to that in effect in New Jersey3 -
which not only requires a respondent to reply to the discovery requests
but also notifies him of the conseqences for failure to reply - for
such a procedure is first mandated by the requirements of the con-
stitution, 36 and, secondly, compelled by strong policy considerations.37
The Constitutionality of the Proposed Default Mechanism
Faced with the possible imposition of sanctions for failing to
reply to discovery requests for relevant information, a recalcitrant
respondent may argue that the entire default mechanism, by side-
stepping a hearing on the merits, works an unconstitutional denial
of due process. Such an argument is not persuasive when tested
against the judicially established requirements of due process.
There are few concepts which are more basic to American
jurisprudence than due process. However,
consideration of what procedures due process may require
under any given set of circumstances must begin with a
determination of the precise nature of the government func-
tions involved as well as of the private interest that has been
affected by governmental action.3
In other words, while principles of due process are at the very roots
of the Constitution, and surely the main stay of the fourteenth amend-
ment, there is no absolute set of standards to be followed which would
assure compliance with due process. But, even though there is no
single formula under which one may be afforded due process, there
are several elements without which due process would not exist. One
such element is the opportunity to be heard. In 1914 the Supreme
Court stated that "[tihe fundamental requisite of due process of law
is the opportunity to be heard. ' 3 While the importance of the op-
35 For a copy of the New Jersey notice and order, see N.J.S.A. 13:4-8, 3(A) (1) (b) (1972).
36See discussion beginning at note 38 infra, and accompanying text.
3 Subrin and Dykstra, Notice and the Right to be Heard: The Significance of Old Friends,
9 HARV. CIrv. RTs-CIv. LB. L. REV. (1974).
3 Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); accord,
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951). The con-
stitutional doctrine of separation of powers is not a bar to the vesting of adjudicatory
powers in administrative agencies provided that certain minimal procedural requirements
are met. As such, the courts have concluded that the standard of due process applicable to
administrative proceedings is not the same, nor as strict, as that applied to judicial pro-
ceedings. See Application of Milton Hardware Co., 19 Ohio App. 2d 157, 250 N.E.2d
262 (1969). Therefore, if the proposed default procedure is found to comport with the
judicial standard of due process, a fortiori, it will meet the administrative standard.
39 Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
1975]
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portunity to be heard has been expressed more eloquently," certainly
no statement can make its importance any clearer. The opportunity
to be heard, being the very least which due process commands, may
cause us to question whether or not a default mechanism based upon
Federal Rule 37 is violative of due process." The history of the rule42
and the judicial pronouncements thereunder have shown the rule to
be in conformance with the requirements of due process.
40 See, e.g., Poindexter v. Willis, 23 Ohio Misc. 199, 208, 256 N.E.2d 254, 260 (C.P. 1970),
wherein the court stated:
Due process of law in the XIV Amendment refers to that law of the land in each
state which derives its authority from the inherent and reserved powers of the
state exerted within the limits of those fundamental principles of liberty and
justice which lie at the basis of all our civil and political institutions. It implies
comformity with the natural and inherent principles of justice and requires
that no one shall be condemned in person or property without opportunity
to be heard.
41 OHIO R. Civ. P. 37. The relevant portions of Rule 37 are as follows:
(B) (2) If any party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a
person designated under Rule 30(B) (5) or Rule 31(A) to testify on behalf
of a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an
order made under subdivision (A) of this rule and Rule 35, the court in
which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as
are just, and among others the following:
(a) An order that the matters regarding which the order was made or
any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the
purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party ob-
taining the order;
(b) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from intro-
ducing designated matters in evidence;
(c) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further
proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or pro-
ceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against
the disobedient party;
(d) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an
order treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders
except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination....
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court shall
require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising him or both
to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure,
unless the court expressly finds that the failure was substantially justified or that
other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust....
And Rule 37 (D) provides:
If a parry or an officer, director, or a managing agent of a party or a person
designated under Rule 30(B) (5) or Rule 31(A) to testify on behalf of a party
fails (1) to appear before the officer who is to take his deposition, after being
served with a proper notice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to inter-
rogatories submitted under Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories,
or (3) to serve written response to a request for inspection submitted under
Rule 34, after proper service of the request, the court in which the action is
pending on motion and notice may make such orders in regard to the failure
as are just, and among others it may take any action authorized under subsection
(a), (b) and (c) of subdivision (B) (2) of this rule. In lieu of any order
or in addition thereto, the court shall require the parry failing to act or the attorney
advising him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees,
caused by the failure, unless the court expressly finds that the failure was sub-
stantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
42 See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2281 (1973).
[Vol. 24:62
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In Hovey v. Elliot,43 the Supreme Court, in a pre-rules decision,
found a denial of due process where, as a penalty for refusal to obey
a court order, a refractory defendant, not in default for answer, had
his answer stricken and a decree pro confesso entered against him.
The Court, per Justice White, said:
If the legislative department of the government were to enact
a statute conferring the right to condemn the citizen without
any opportunity whatever of being heard, would it be pre-
tended that such an enactment would not be violative of the
Constitution? . . . [H]ow can it be said that the judicial
department, the source and foundation of justice itself, has
yet the authority to render lawful that which if done under
express legislative sanction would be violative of the
Constitution. 4
Twelve years later, in Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas,45 another
pre-rules decision, the Supreme Court allowed the use of the same
remedies as those denied in Hovey. The Hammond Packing Co., in an
action under a state antitrust law had refused to produce books,
papers and witnesses before the examining commissioner. A state
court, pursuant to a state statute, had ordered the production. Upon
the failure, the court, as authorized by its state statute, struck the
company's answer and entered a default judgment. The Court, affirm-
ing the judgment of the state court, found Hovey not controlling:
Hovey v. Elliott involved a denial of all right to defend as a
mere punishment. This case presents a failure by the
defendant to produce what we must assume was material
evidence in its possession, and a resulting striking out of
an answer and a default. The proceeding here taken may
therefore find its sanction in the undoubted right of the law-
making power to create a presumption of fact as to the bad
faith and untruth of an answer to be gotten from the sup-
pression or failure to produce the proof ordered, when such
proof concerned the rightful decision of the cause. . . .The
difference between mere punishment, as illustrated in Hovey
v. Elliott, and the power exerted in this, is as follows: In
the former, due process of law was denied by the refusal to
hear. In this, the preservation of due process of law was
secured by the presumption that the refusal to produce
43 197 U.S. 409 (1897).
MId. at 417.
45212 U.S. 322 (1909
1975l
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evidence material to the administration of due process was
but an admission of the want of merit in the asserted
defense.46
In 1958, after the adoption of the Federal Rules, the Court again
dealt with the problem of sanctions. In Societe Internationale Pour
Participations Industrieles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Brownell,1
plaintiff's action was dismissed due to the failure to comply with
an order under Rule 34 to produce certain documents. Although
plaintiff had attempted to achieve compliance with the order, he
had been unable to do so because Swiss law, which was controlling
on plaintiff, forbade the disclosures sought. In reversing this dis-
missal, the Court stated that the two earlier decisions
establish that there are constitutional limitations upon the
power of courts, even in aid of their own valid processes,
to dismiss an action without affording a party the oppor-
tunity for a hearing on the merits of his cause. 8
However, the Court did not find it necessary to decide the case on
constitutional grounds. The question raised in Societe, which had not
been dealt with in earlier decisions, was whether due process was
violated by the striking of a complaint by the court because of a
plaintiff's inability to comply with a pretrial production order,
despite the plaintiff's good faith efforts to comply. The Court held
that the failure to respond to a court order to produce was a non-
compliance, bringing Rule 37 into play, even though in good faith
the failure could not have been avoided. However, the Court held
that the sanction of dismissal could not be imposed if the failure to
comply was due to the inability of the party. The Societe principle
has also been extended to a default judgment imposed against a
defendant who, in good faith, was unable to comply with an order
to produce (i.e., his inability to produce was fostered neither by his
own conduct, not by circumstances within his control). 4 Thus, the
courts are very conscious of the rule in Societe and the constitutional
limitations set forth in Hovey and Hammond. Where good faith and
diligent efforts are made by a party to comply, dismissals and de-
fault judgments have not usually been upheld. Rather, the courts
4Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 351 (1909). For an interesting discus-
sion of the adverse inference rule in an administrative proceeding, see, International
Union v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
4357 U.S. 197 (1958).
48Id. at 208-09.
49 See Read v. Ulmer, 308 F.2d 915, 918 (5th Cir. 1962).
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have required the facts and circumstances of the individual cases
be closely scrutinized and balanced to determine whether or not
sanction should be imposed."s
Another aspect of the constitutional problem concerns the ques-
tion of whether or not a defendant, in failing to answer an interroga-
tory on one specific issue, may be subject to the court's striking his
answer to plaintiff's complaint and entering default judgment against
him. Some courts have ruled that entering default judgment for
failure to answer one interrogatory was improper and that the
appropriate sanction in such a case is to bar the party from present-
ing evidence on issues related to the interrogatory which was not
answered.5 1 However, this approach is not universally accepted.
For example, in United States v. 3963 Bottles, More or Less, Etc.,5
2
where a defendant failed to answer interrogatories regarding the
production, research and testing of drugs that entered interstate com-
merce, and the issue of the testing and research of the drug was a
key matter, a default decree of condemnation was affirmed. Further,
one commentator has noted that
the orginial Advisory Committee [on the Federal Rules],
dicussing the Hovey and Hammond Cases in its note to Rule
37 appears to have taken the view that the availability of
the sanctions of dismissal or default judgment is a reason-
able means of securing the production of material evidence
by discovery, and therefore consistent with due process.
Should the Supreme Court be willing to adopt this inter-
pretation with only the qualification that the refusal be
willful, there would appear to be no constitutional require-
ment that the sanctions be limited to those specific issues
for which discovery is sought.5
3
As various sections of Rule 37 have come under attack, courts
have upheld the validity of the rule as it relates to due process.
Maurice Rosenberg summarized the result of this litigation:
[T] he court may make such orders "in regard to the refusal
as are just" including an order deeming certain facts estab-
S°Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 376 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
859 (1968).
s Ward v. Hester, 32 Ohio App. 2d 121, 288 N.E.2d 840 (1972), aff'd, 36 Ohio St. 2d
38, 303 N.E.2d 861 (1973); Mitchell v. Watson, 58 Wash. 2d 206, 361 P.2d 744
(1961).
52265 F.2d 332 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 931 (1959).
S3Developments in the Law - Discovery, 74 HARv. L. REv. 940, 990 (1961).
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lished, precluding evidence on certain claims or defenses,
striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or rendering a de-
fault judgment.- (citations omitted).
In Norman v. Young,55 default judgment was entered by the
district court against a defendant for the failure to produce certain
documents. On appeal, the defendant challenged the court's authority
to enter a default judgment pursuant to Rule 37(b) (2) (iii) ; the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's
action. The court, citing the reasoning used in Hammond, said:
[A] court could properly strike an answer and enter a default
judgment under circumstances where a party fails to produce
documents as ordered. . . . [T]rial courts have inherent
power to presume the bad faith and untruth of an answer
where the proof was suppressed provided it was essential to
the disposition of the case.56
The proposed default mechanism is analogous to that available
under Federal Rule 37(b) (2) (c) and Ohio Rule 37(B) (2) (c) and,
therefore, comports with the due process standards set forth in both
Hammond and Norman. While it may be argued that the implementa-
tion of the default judgment by the Ohio Civil Rights Commission
seems to be in the nature of a punishment, and thus proscribed by
Hovey, the Norman court makes allowances for this type of situation:
Undoubtedly this default judgment includes an element of
punishment, as the Rule intends.... But here the element of
punishment does not rise to the level of reprisal. . . . The
entry of default judgment was not vindictive but was com-
pelled by defendant's conduct, in order to protect the statu-
torily created right of discovery and the constitutionally
guarded due process right of plaintiff. 7
In Ward v. Hester,5 the first reported Ohio case to deal with the
issue of sanctions under Rule 37, plaintiff brought an action to recover
for personal injuries allegedy caused by defendant's agent. Plaintiff
served on defendant a request for the production of certain docu-
ments for inspection and copying. Receiving no response from de-
fendant, plaintiff obtained from the court an order compelling the
production of the documents requested. Finally, defendant having
failed to comply with the order, plaintiff filed a motion requesting
the court to impose Rule 37 sanctions. The trial court, in imposing the
S4Rosenberg, Sanctiots to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 COL. L. REv. 480, 487-88
(1958). This article has been cited with approval by at least 8 federal courts including
the United States Supreme Court in Societe.
55422 F.2d 470 (10th Cit. 1970).
S'Id. at 473.
s Id. at 474.
58 32 Ohio App. 2d 121, 288 N.E.2d 840 (1972).
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sanctions, ordered that for the purposes of the action all matters re-
garding the agency and scope of employment issues were to be deemed
established in accordance with the plaintiff's allegations. Following
trial, defendant appealed alleging that the imposition of the sanctions
deprived defendant of a hearing on the merits and arguing, inter alia,
that
the documents sought ... related only to the issue of agency
and not to the issue of scope of employment and that if it
could be determined that the trial court could impose the
sanction of eliminating the issue of agency it still could not
properly impose a sanction eliminating the issue of scope of
employment. 9
The Court of Appeals for Allen County determined that the trial
court had not abused its discretion in imposing sanctions under
Rule 37.
Sanction orders are long established in our jurisprudence
and there seems to be no sound reason that we can fathom
to determine that an order made [due to willfulness or bad
faith] and not made in the face of proof of inability to com-
ply, should be unconstitutional in any of the respects asserted
by defendant company."0
59 Id. at 125-26, 288 N.E.2d at 843-44.
60 Id. at 126-27, 288 N.E.2d at 844.
Discovery, as well as being a means of reducing the difficulties of obtaining
evidence, is part of the process of narrowing the issues for trial, with full pro-
tection given to the party against whom discovery is sought to have his day in
court by applying for a protective order under Rule 26(C), or in resisting a
motion for an order compelling discovery under Rule 37(A), or in resisting
the imposition of sanctions under Rule 37(B). If the party against whom
discovery is sought has not sought a protective order, has not brought forth
proper reasons for the denial of an order compelling discovery, or has not shown
proper reasons why sanctions should not be imposed he has effectively waived
his right to assert the issues which the court's sanctions deprive him from
asserting and he has not been deprived of any further constitutional due process
or right of trial by jury any more than he would have been so deprived had
he failed to file an answer to the plaintiff's complaint, or in some other manner
had failed to join issue.
It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the rights of either party to an action
to object to the use of interrogatories or other discovery devices in a particular situation.
However, it should be noted that these rights do exist and recognition of this is found
in Rule 26(C) of both the Ohio and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Ohio rule
reads, in part, as follows:
Upon motion by any party or by the person from whom discovery is sought,
and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending may make
any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense....
OHIO R. CIv. P. 26(C). The Ward court discussed these rights and further noted the
propriety of Rule 37 sanctions against those individuals for whom the rule is not applicable
or who ignore its provisions.
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The court went on to expand the Norman rule which limited the
sanction to evidence which was essential to the disposition of the case.
We find in Rule 37 (B) nothing limiting the scope of sanctions
solely to the issue to which the matter to be discovered relates.
Subdivisions 2(a), 2 (b) and 2(c) thereof provide, in each
case, for sanctions beyond such issues including the ultimate
sanctions of dismissal of the action or default judgment.
Moreover, although agency might be determined as a fact
without any determination of scope of employment the re-
verse is not usually true, as scope of employment depends
largely on the fact and character of the agency.61
The trend of authority leaves no doubt as to the constitutionality
of Rule 37 and its conformance with due process standards. In Link
v. Wabash R.R.,62 the Supreme Court, per Justice Harlan, upheld
the district court's sua sponte dismissal, pursuant to Rule 41, in a
diversity of citizenship action when the plaintiff's attorney failed to
indicate a "reasonable reason" for his non-appearance at a pre-trial
hearing. In holding that such a harsh procedure was not violative of
due process the court indicated that
the adequacy of notice and hearing respecting proceedings
that may affect a party's rights turns, to a considerable ex-
tent, on the knowledge which the circumstances show such
party may be taken to have of the consequences of his own
conduct. 3
As was earlier pointed out, considerations of the precise nature of
due process are not to be found. While there is agreement as to some
of its components (i.e., opportunity to be heard and adequate notice),
many of its requirements are left to the discretion of the court as it
balances competing interests. Thus, as the fact situations vary, the
standards determining what constitutes due process have also varied.
While one must agree that due process of law is as equally appli-
cable to administrative as it is to judicial proceedings," the question
of what standard of due process administrative hearings must meet
remains unanswered. Courts are of the opinion that standards for
administrative due process need not be as rigid as those to be followed
for judicial due process. This willingness to "relax" due process
standards may be attributed in part to a desire to expedite administra-
61 Id. at 128-29, 288 N.E.2d at 845-46.
62370 U.S. 626 (1962).
63Id. at 632. Cf. United States v. Inter-American Shipping Corp., 455 F.2d 938 (5th Cit.
1972).
"See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 4 Pa.
Cmwlth. 448, 287 A.2d 161 (1972), aff'd, 413 U.S. 376 (1973). "
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tive hearings65 and in part to the availablity of judicial review to
remedy any serious administrative errors. However, the procedure is
not to be so relaxed that all standards of due process are ignored.
It has been held that in a state administrative hearing
due process of law is afforded when (1) the 'accused' is in-
formed with reasonable certainty of the accusation lodged
against him, (2) he has timely notice and opportunity to
answer these charges and to defend against attempted proof
of such accusation, and (3) the proceedings are conducted in
a fair and impartial manner.66
In 1962, in R. A. Holman v. SEC,67 the district court for the District of
Columbia, wheighing the public good against the defendant's right to
do business, upheld a Securities and Exchange Commission rule under
which the plaintiff's exemption from certain registration require-
ments was temporarily suspended, without notice or hearing. While
the rule approved in Holman may seem a drastic denial of due process
it indicates the power which courts are willing to confer upon admin-
istrative agencies. Often the individual interests must be accomodated
so that the administrative agency can more readily utilize its time and
process to protect the public interests.
The proposed default procedure affords the respondent the high-
est degree of due process. The ultimate assurances of due process are
the "safeguards" upon which the respondent may rely. The mechan-
isms in effect to insure the respondent a proper degree of protection
are the opportunity to request protective orders; the limiting of the
scope of investigation ;18 the availability of a procedure for setting
aside a default; and the resort to the courts for judicial review of
a final order. Any one of these standing alone would protect the
respondent's rights. All four of them operating together seem to
make a denial of due process a spurious argument.
Conclusion
Confronting discrimination means dealing with blatant denials
of equality. The legislature must not allow a person charged with
such illegal acts to delay an investigation of the charge by refusing
to comply with discovery. A speedy determination of the merits of
65 Marine Space Enclosures, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Commission, 420 F.2d 577, 589-90
(D.C. Cir. 1969). "The requirement of a hearing in a proceeding before an administra-
tive agency may be satisfied by something less time-consuming than courtroom drama."
"Pittsburgh Press v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 4 Pa. Cmwlth. 448, 452,
287 A.2d 161, 166 (1972), aIJ'd, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
67299 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 911 (1962). See also Aircrane
Inc. v. Butterfield, 369 F.Supp. 598 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
'aSee OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.04(B) (3) (a) (Page 1973) (requiring all Com-
mission investigation to comply with the fourth amendment to the Constitution).
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every case is essential to the preservation of civil rights. Litigation
can be, and often is, costly and time consuming. While the rights of
all parties in litigation must be protected, the legislature should not
be willing to allow either party to obstruct justice. The refusal to
comply with relevant discovery requests results in lengthy and ex-
pensive hearings and trial. The proposed procedure would allow the
Ohio Civil Right Commission to render determinations quickly and
inexpensively while remaining within the constitutional bounds of
due process.
The default procedure herein discussed, affording the respondent
an opportunity to be heard, operates fairly and conforms with due
process principles while preventing undue delay in the protection of
the complainant's civil rights. Such a procedure is vitally needed.
And after the order-notice sequence is added to the proposed House
Bill, hopefully the proposed procedure will become the procedure.
17Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1975
